How Editors and Universities Need to Work Together to Prevent Misconduct

Professor Ben R. Martin
SPRU – Science and Technology Policy Research, The Freeman Centre, University of Sussex
Brighton, BN1 9QE, UK
(B.Martin@sussex.ac.uk)

Presentation at 2nd World Conference on Research Integrity, Singapore, 21-24 July 2010
Introduction

The self-policing of ‘The Republic of Science’
• Academic misconduct is **rare**, generally **low-level**, and **self-correcting**.
• Any serious misconduct is **quickly detected** by peer review and **stopped**.
• The risks of being caught and the resulting sanctions are so great that **few** are **tempted** to stray down this route.

But assumes
• peer review succeeds in detecting misconduct
• editors (& publishers etc.) and universities work together

Case-study – what happens when editors and universities **do not** work closely together?
Sent: Wednesday, June 06, 2007 3:47 PM
To: sthomke@hbs.edu
Subject: Possible Plagiarism in Research Policy

Dr. Thomke,

While reviewing the literature regarding technology diffusion models, I came across a paper published in Research Policy by Hans W. Gottinger that appears to be heavily plagiarized from an earlier paper by Frank M. Bass. The references for these two papers are respectively:


Dr. Gottinger’s paper presents a demand model for technology diffusion that is identical to Dr. Bass’s without citation. In fact, there are several passages that are identical word for word. Note in particular the sections titled “The experience curve” and “Estimation...
Hypothesis 1

Borderline plagiarism?
3. The experience curve

The concept of declining costs and prices resulting from learning as expressed in the accumulated experience of a firm has been extensively developed and applied by the Boston Consulting Group [3] with further clarification and specification by Spence [15], Fudenberg and Tirole [6], Hart [10], to name only a few. Apparently the earliest identification of the particular form of the experience curve was found in the study of learning curves for airframes. Arrow [1] utilized this form in his pioneering paper, and the same form has been employed by the Boston Consulting Group. The marginal cost function, called the experience curve is

\[ MC(Y(t)) = C_1 [Y(t)]^{-\lambda} \]  

where \( MC(Y(t)) \) is the cost of producing the \( Y \)th unit of output, \( Y(t) \) is the accumulation output at time \( t \), \( C_1 \) is a scaling parameter, sometimes referred to as the cost of producing the first unit, and \( \lambda \) is a learning parameter, \( \lambda > 0 \), that could be identified as "localized learning" in the sense of Stiglitz [16].

The current marginal cost depends not only on current output, but also on earlier output, or
Hypothesis 2

Author produced just a single paper, then disappeared?
118 results found (Set #1)

1. **Gottinger HW**
   Global technological races
   Times Cited: 0
   Find it®US

2. **Gottinger HW**
   Special issue - Optimal energy economics under global environmental constraints - Preface
   INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLLUTION 17 (5-6): 415-639 2002
   Times Cited: 0
   Find it®US

3. **Gottinger HW**
   Modeling stochastic innovation races
   TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING AND SOCIAL CHANGE 69 (6): 607-624 JUL 2002
   Times Cited: 0
   Find it®US
Hypothesis 3

A one-off ‘moment of madness’?
How to check?
Google Advanced Search

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A Case of Plagiarism

A Case of Plagiarism. RenC L. Frey, Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger. A reader of Kyklos recently advised us that the paper by Hans W. Gottinger en...


Bidding for Research Initiatives: a Reprise

A Case of Plagiarism

René L. Frey, Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger


Gottinger was given the opportunity to reply to the accusation of plagiarism. But he did not produce a satisfactory explanation.

On the basis of the available evidence, we are convinced that this is a clear case of plagiarism, and we hereby extend our apologies to Dr. Wyatt as well as to the readers of Kyklos. Plagiarism jeopardizes scientific research and is a strong infringement on authors’ rights. As a consequence, the editors have decided:

- not to accept any future paper by Gottinger;
- to request the leading citation and abstracting indexers to delete all references and citations to Gottinger’s paper;
- to inform other leading journals in economics as well as the dean and rector of the institutions where Gottinger is employed;
- to publish an accurate summary of Wyatt’s paper in this issue of Kyklos and to make the full article available on the world wide web.

René L. Frey  Bruno S. Frey  Reiner Eichenberger
Managing editors
Competitive Bidding for Research

Hans W. Gottinger*

I INTRODUCTION

Many researchers are routinely responding to ‘research initiatives’ put forward by funding bodies such as research councils and the European Union, in which the funding body designates some area within which it wishes to see proposals. These initiatives in effect call for competitive tendering of research proposals by research teams. In many instances there is a high ratio of applications to actual grants, with the apparent implication that a lot of researcher effort has been wasted drawing up the unsuccessful proposals.
RETRACTED: Estimating demand for SDI-related spin-off technologies

Hans W. Gottinger

Nuffield College, Oxford OX1 1NF, UK

Available online 1 April 2002.

This article has now been formally retracted at the request of Editors-in-Chief. Please see
http://www.elsevier.com/locate/withdrawalpolicy. The Publisher apologizes for any inconvenience this may cause.

Reason: This article substantially copies large sections from an earlier article by F. M. Bass [The relationship between diffusion rates, experience curves, and demand elasticities for consumer technological innovations. The Journal of Business 53 (3) (1980), S51-S67]. It presents a demand model for technology diffusion that is almost identical to that put forward by Professor Bass without citing or acknowledging this earlier paper. In addition, the data it uses are not drawn from the source cited but appear to have been fabricated.


Correspondence to: H.W. Gottinger, Nuffield College, Oxford OX1 1NF, UK

* The author is grateful to the referees for perceptive remarks on the model and related issues that helped to improve the presentation.
Hypothesis 4


Problem occurred only during a relatively brief period when Gottinger under stress?

Stopped once caught in 1999?
2. THE BACKGROUND: ECONOMIC AND NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

In this section, the production, consumption, and climatic aspects of the model are specified. As in a previous paper [1] we shall consider a world that consists of two countries. The two countries have the same preferences, the same production technology, the same climate, but (maybe) different population sizes. Two goods can be produced, one of which is an agricultural good and the other a manufactured good. The productivity of the agricultural sector is affected by the global temperature. The manufacturing activities, on the other hand, affect temperature level.

The formal specification of the model is as follows:

1. The time, denoted $t$, is discrete and the horizon is infinite: $t \in \{0, 1, \ldots\}$
2. The world consists of two countries: Country $H$ and Country $F$. Population in each country is constant over time.

Let the size of the world population be normalized to one country. Country $H$ has a population of size $\alpha$, while Country $F$ has $1 - \alpha$. Population is immobile between countries. The two countries are assumed to have identical production technology, identical preferences and identical climate. In what follows, the production and consumption size of the model is specified for Country $H$. The variables of Country $F$ which will be denoted by attaching a superscript $^F$ can be specified in the same way.

In this section the production, consumption, and climatic aspects of a world economy are specified. Roughly speaking, we shall consider a world that consists of two countries. Two goods are produced, one of which is an agricultural good and the other a manufactured good. The productivity of the agricultural sector is affected by the global temperature. The manufacturing activities, on the other hand, affect temperature level.

The formal specification of the model follows. Time, denoted by $t$, is discrete and the horizon is infinite: $t \in \{0, 1, \ldots\}$. The world consists of two countries: $H$ and $F$. Population in each country is constant over time. Let the size of world population be normalized to one Country $H$ has a population of size $\alpha$, whereas Country $F$, $1 - \alpha$.

The two countries are assumed to have identical production technologies, identical preferences, and identical climate. In what follows the production and consumption sizes of the model are specified for Country $H$. The variables of Country $F$, which will be denoted by attaching a superscript $^F$, can be specified in the same way.

On the production side of the world, two non-storable goods are produced, an agricultural good and a manufactured good, with quantities being denoted by $X_1$ and $X_2$. Goods can be transported at zero cost.

There is a fixed continuum of firms in each industry. Hence both industries are perfectly competitive. Labor is the only input of production. At each date a representative firm in industry $i$ $(i = 1, 2)$ chooses the level of employment in the industry, $L_i$.

The production technology of both goods exhibits constant returns to scale. The productivity of labor in the manufacturing sector does not depend on climate and is denoted by $b$. Output of the manufacturing sector at date $t$ can then be written as $X_2 = bL_2$. In the agricultural sector, however, the productivity of labor depends on one aspect of the climate, namely, the global temperature. Let $d(\tau_t)$ denote the productivity coefficient of the agricultural sector, i.e., $X_1 = d(\tau_t) L_1$, where $\tau_t$ is the world average temperature level in period $t$.

The variable $d(\tau_t)$ captures the effects of global warming on agriculture. It is assumed that $d(\tau_t) > 0$: $d(\tau_t) = 0$ and $d(\tau_t) < 0$ for all $\tau_t \in [\tau_1, \tau_0]$. The temperature level $\tau_t$ denotes the “natural” temperature level, i.e., the level at which the global temperature would stay in the absence of any manufacturing activities, while $\tau_0$ is the temperature level at which the agriculture productivity equals zero. Therefore, by assumption the agriculture productivity is positive when there have been no manufacturing activities. A higher level of temperature reduces the agriculture productivity. The agriculture productivity eventually approaches zero as temperature level reaches $\tau_0$.

According to Lin et al., this effect becomes zero at $\tau_0$.\[1\]
International Journal of Global Energy Issues

Issue: Volume 18, Numbers 2-4 / 2002
Pages: 181 - 201
URL: Linking Options

Negotiation and optimality in an economic model of global climate change

Hans W. Gottinger

A1 Institute of Management Science, Univ. of Maastricht (RL), The Netherlands

Abstract:

We suggest a two-country, two-sector model as a basis for the control of global climate change in which the dynamic time path of the world economy is analysed under the provision that the outcomes of a negotiation game generate the global optimal solution.
Incentive compatible environmental regulation

Hans Werner Gottinger

IIEEM and University of Maastricht (RL), Netherlands

Received 30 November 1999; accepted 23 April 2001

Optimal environmental regulations are derived in the presence of asymmetric information and abatement costs. It is recognized that compliance may have to be induced through appropriate monitoring and enforcement measures. The regulator commits to monitoring of compliance with the incentive compatible environmental regulation and asymmetric information characterizes the interaction between the firm and regulator. A possibility of monitoring abatement standards and corresponding subsidies are optimally chosen to ensure firm compliance. Enforcement considerations are shown to distort downward the pollution abatement requirements mandated for firms.

Keywords: environmental regulation, asymmetric information, incentive compatibility, monitoring

1. Introduction

In the regulatory setting, it seems quite reasonable to assume that firms have much better information about their productive capabilities and abatement opportunities than does the regulator. In the model of environmental regulation with asymmetric information which follows, the regulator anticipates the strategic response of a firm possessing full information about the cost of pollution abatement. In this model, it is assumed that the regulator can induce a commitment to an incentive schedule from which the firm chooses a pollution abatement level and receives the corresponding subsidy. Informally, the regulator’s problem can be represented as a direct revelation game in which the regulator commits to an incentive schedule assigning abatement responsibility and the level of subsidy to the firm on the basis of a procedure that encourages one-firm-to-the-next best.

A theoretical justification for the restriction to an incentive compatible regulatory mechanism is provided by the revelation principle (Laffont and Tirole, 1992). In the present context, the revelation principle states that for any indirect regulatory mechanism (and, in particular, any one in which the firm misrepresents its privately held information about abatement costs), a direct mechanism may be found which achieves the regulator’s objective just as successfully and which also induces truthful revelation of the key information.

Attempts to construct incentive compatible environmental regulations (e.g. Kwerel, 1977, Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin, 1980, and Spulber, 1986) have neglected to address the equally important issue of enforcement. The connections between incentive-compatible standard setting and costly monitoring and enforcement have been insufficiently explored in the environmental economics literature. Indeed, uniform standard setting should
Now things are getting serious

1. A serial plagiariser
2. Did not stop after he was caught in 1999

Time to hand the case over to his employer for a full investigation of his other 100 articles and dozen books

Who is his university employer?
Hans-Werner Göttinger

CHOICE AND COMPLEXITY

Hans W. GOTTINGER
The University of Maastricht (RU), Institute of Management Science, PO Box 591, Maastricht, The Netherlands

and

Department of Systems Engineering, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22901, U.S.A.

Communicated by F.W. Roush
Received 6 May 1986

An attempt is made to propose a concept of limited rationality for choice functions based on computability theory in computer science.

Starting with the observation that it is possible to construct a machine simulating strategies of each individual in society, one machine for each individual's preference structure, we identify internal states of this machine with strategies or strategic preferences. Inputs are possible actions of other agents in society, thus society is effectively operating as a social choice machine. The main result states that effective realization of choice functions is bound by the 'complexity of
been wasted drawing up the unsuccessful proposals.

The situation resembles the case of socially wasteful rent seeking (Buchanan 1980), which appears not to have been treated as such in the design of bidding for research projects. From the results of modelling such a situation we could expect important policy conclusions for R&D and technology policy. It is also of more general concern whether excessive competition could be socially damaging, how and why? (Suzumura 1995). Related results pointing in the same direction are due to Dasgupta and Maskin (1987).

The basic facts motivate an examination of the process by which research is commissioned. A first question that arises is: how can the process be modelled? It seems reasonable to assume that researchers or their leaders are rational, and that they act rationally with respect to some objective functions. Scientific reputation and ratings depend importantly on assessments of research performance, and that is often judged by quantitative measures of both research output and research inputs. Research inputs in the form of funding from grant giving bodies have been seen as evidence of research activity rather than as a cost of

* Prof Dr, International Institute for Environmental Economics and Management (IIEEM), Schloss, D-88339 Bad Waldsee, Germany, IMS, University of Maastricht (RL), NL-6200 AN Maastricht and School of Economics, University of Nagasaki, Nagasaki 850, Japan
Competitive positioning through strategic alliance formation: review and synthesis

Hans-Werner Gottinger

Institute of Economic Analysis,
University of Osaka (KGU),
Osaka, Japan
E-mail: hansgottinger@aol.com

Abstract: This paper explores competitive positioning through network competition on the basis of alliance formation (strategic alliances, joint ventures). From a strategic perspective, technological competition will be refined and expanded into new markets, or new markets will be created through alliance formation. Alliance formation could speed up competitive positioning and technological leadership in strategically important, though geographically diverse, markets. Revenue management tools can help in linking alliance formation to better competitive outcomes, thereby improving strategic directions.

Keywords: competition; corporate governance; managerial economics; networks; revenue management; strategic alliance.


Bibliographic notes: Dr. Gottinger is a Professor of Economics at the University of Osaka (KGU), and the Director of the Institute of Management Science, Maastricht, NL. He has internationally taught and widely published in the areas of industrial, energy and environmental economics. In these areas he has also advised international organisations.
Dear Mr Gottinger,

On several websites, including www.worldsustainable.org, you present yourself as 'Director of the Institute of Management Science, University of Maastricht in the Netherlands'.

This institute does not exist, nor have you been appointed or are you affiliated with Maastricht University (UM) or its institutes in any capacity whatsoever. We have received complaints about this incorrect designation, which is harmful to the university's reputation.

UM cannot allow third parties to formally present themselves as being part of its organisation. Therefore, the Executive Board summons you to ensure that all erroneous and false information is removed without delay from the websites and publications in which it appears.

Should you fail to do so within fourteen days, we will be forced to take legal action.

Yours sincerely,

Dr J.M.M. Ritzen
President
Maastricht University Executive Board
by research teams. In many instances there’s a high ratio of applications to actual grants, with the apparent implication that a lot of researcher effort has been wasted drawing up the unsuccessful proposals.

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* Prof Dr., International Institute for Environmental Economics and Management (IIEEM), Schloss, D-88339 Bad Waldsee, Germany, IMS, University of Maastricht (RL), NL-6200 AN Maastricht and School of Economics, University of Nagasaki, Nagasaki 850, Japan
Econometric modelling, estimation and policy analysis of oil spill processes

Author: Gottinger, Hans W.
Publisher: Inderscience Publishers

Abstract:
This paper explores approaches to model specification suitable for empirical investigation of a stochastic oil spill model. We focus on the effects of economic incentive measures on the frequency of oil spills, spill size, and volume of oil spilled. We look into the relationships between parameters that describe the spill generation process and the enforcement effort, using data for the Black and Baltic Seas.

Keywords: ENVIRONMENTAL JOURNALS; Environment and Sustainable Development
Document Type: Research article
DOI: 10.1504/IJEP.2001.000271
Affiliations: 1: International Institute for Environmental Economics and Management (IIERM), Schloss Waldsee, D 88339, Bad Waldsee, Germany
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A dynamic model of optimal reduction of marine oil pollution International Institute for Environmental Economics and Management (IIEM), Schloss Waldsee, D 88339 Bad Waldsee, Germany. ' Program Systems Institute, RAS, ... www.inderscience.com/search/index.php?action=record&rec_id=5192&prevQuery=&ps=10&m=or - Similar pages

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Suggestions:

- Make sure all words are spelled correctly.
- Try different keywords.
- Try more general keywords.
- Try fewer keywords.
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

- Research Assistant, The Netherlands School of Economics, Econometric Section, Rotterdam, March - September 1968
- Lecturer, Institute of Econometrics and Statistics, University of Munich, January 1969 - June 1970
- Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fellowship, Dept. of Statistics and Economics, University of California, Berkeley, July 1970 - June 1972
- Professor of Decision Science, Institute of Mathematical Economics, University Bielefeld, Germany, 1974 - 1983
- Professor, Institute of Management Science, Faculty of Economics, The University of Maastricht, The Netherlands, 1983 to now, Institute Director, 1987 - 1990
- Director, International Institute of Technology Management and Economics (IITME), 1995-1999
Dr. Martin Gersch
Competence Center E-Commerce
Ruhr-Universitat Bochum,
Universitatsstr. 150, GC 4/37
44780 Bochum
GERMANY

Prof. Dr. Hans-Werner Göttinger
International Institute for Technology Management and Economics (IITME)
Unterring 21
85051 Ingolstadt
GERMANY

Prof. Puneet Handa
Department of Finance
Tippie College of Business
University of Iowa
S 280, PBAB
Iowa City IA 52241
USA

Dr. Andreas Hoecht
Portsmouth Business School
University of Portsmouth,
Richmond Building, Portland Street
Portsmouth, PO1 3DE
Dear Ben,

I looked him up in the German phonebook (www.teleauskunft.de).

Here we go:

Göttinger Hans-Werner Prof. Dr. u. Gertraud Adresse
Unterringstr. 21
85051 Ingoistadt / Haunwöhr
Telefon 0841 97 51 15

Stefan Thomke
Tip: Save time by hitting the return key instead of clicking on "search"


Suggestions:

- Make sure all words are spelled correctly.
- Try different keywords.
- Try more general keywords.
- Try fewer keywords.
Hypothesis 5

Although it may occasionally slip up with regard to ensuring the research integrity of publications, the peer-review process works much more thoroughly when it comes to the selection of individuals, for example in choosing the Chair and Head of Department.

Goldberg, Mark K. Professor of Computer Science; Member, Faculty of Information Technology; Ph.D. (Mathematical Institute of the Academy of Science, Novosibirsk, USSR).

Goldenberg, David H. Associate Professor in Lally School of Management and Technology; Ph.D. (University of Florida).

Gordon, Tamar Assistant Professor of Anthropology and Sociolinguistics; Ph.D. (University of California, Berkeley).

Gottinger, Hans  Professor and Chair of Economics; Ph.D. (University of Munich).

Gowdy, John M. Professor; Ph.D. (West Virginia University).

http://www.rpi.edu/dept/catalog/99-00/Faculty/g.html  18/07/2007

Grabowski, Martha R. Research Associate Professor of Decision Sciences and Engineering Systems; Ph.D. (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute).

Graves, Robert J. Professor of Decision Sciences and Engineering Systems; Member, Faculty of Information Technology; Ph.D. (State University of New York, Buffalo).

Greenwood, Allan N. Philip Sporn Professor of Electric Power Engineering; Ph.D. (University of Leeds, England).
Global Dialogue

Earth Community Organization (ECO)
the Global Community

Dr. Hans W. Gottinger
Germany
hq528@bingo.baynet.de
hq528@bingo-ev.de
gottih@rpi.edu
hwgott@aol.com

for Discussion Roundtables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 32, 35, 40, 47, 53, 54, and 55

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5.0 Article 5
6.0 Article 6
Hypothesis 6

Peer review works *even more* thoroughly when choosing the Rector/President of a University.
188. ERGEBNIS DER WAHL DES REKTORS GEMÄSS UOG 1993

Der vom Senat gem. UOG 1993 in seiner Sitzung am 12.6.1995 erstellte Wahlvorschlag lautete:

Prof. Dr. Willibald Dörfler (Uni Klagenfurt)
Prof. Dr. Hans Gottinger (Uni Maastricht)
Prof. Dr. Thomas Heinze (Fernuniversität Hagen)

Die am 14.6.1995 gem. UOG 1993 i.V.m. der Satzung der Universität Klagenfurt durchgeführte Wahl des Rektors durch die Universitätsversammlung brachte folgendes Ergebnis:

Mitglieder der Universitätsversammlung: 100
Abgegebene Stimmen: 89
Ungültige Stimmen: 28

Es entfielen auf:
Prof. Dr. Willibald Dörfler: 40
Prof. Dr. Hans Gottinger: 18
Prof. Dr. Thomas Heinze: 3

Da keiner der Kandidaten mehr als die Hälfte der abgegebenen Stimmen erhalten hat, wurde anschließend eine Stichwahl durchgeführt:

Abgegebene Stimmen: 89
Ungültige Stimmen: 4

Es entfielen auf:

http://www.uni-klu.ac.at/home/mitteiblatt/old/94-95/mittei31 18/07/2007
Die Presse

Uni Salzburg - Acht Kandidaten für Rektorswahl.

153 words
19 May 1998
Die Presse
German
(c) Die Presse 1998 www.diepresse.at.

Die Wahl des Rektors wird am 17. Juni stattfinden.

WIEN (red.). Mit einer Rekordzahl an Bewerbungen wird am 17. Juni die Wahl des Rektors der Universität Salzburg - für eine Amtszeit von vier Jahren - stattfinden. Bis jetzt haben sich acht Kandidaten gemeldet (in alphabetischer Reihenfolge: @KK Univ.-Prof. Dr. Manfred Buchroithner (Kartographie an der TU Dresden); @KK Univ.-Prof. Dr. Hans Gottinger (Managerial and Environmental Economics, University of Maastricht, Niederlande); @KK Univ.-Prof. Dr. Adolfs Haslinger (Germanistik, derzeit Rektor in Salzburg); @KK Dipl.-Informatiker Günter Koch (IT & Telematics, Austrian Research Centers); @KK Univ.-Prof. Dipl.-Ing. Dr. Werner Koenne (Computerwissenschaft, Uni Salzburg); @KK Prof. Dr. Joachim Kohlhof (Betriebswirtschaftslehre, HS für Wirtschaft und Technik, Brandenburg); @KK Prof. DDr. Heiner Timmermann (Neue Geschichte an den Unis Jener, Budapest, Sundsvall und Moskau); @KK Univ.-Prof. Dr. Felix Unger (Herzchirurgie am Landeskrankenhaus Salzburg).
RP and Nature go public

August 2007 – Nature article and RP editorial
What happened next?
Deluge of new information
Number of confirmed cases of plagiarism rose from 3 to 14
  • 9 got past referees & editors and were published
  • only 5 caught before publication
6 instances where Gottinger fired/forced to resign
  • for plagiarism
  • for having 2 full-time jobs & 2 salaries at the same time
  • for forging letters of support in an EU grant application
Gottinger’s institutional affiliations

1968 Research Assistant, Netherlands School of Economics, Rotterdam
1969-70 Lecturer, Institute of Econometrics and Statistics, University of Munich
1970-72 Ford Foundation Fellow, Department of Statistics and Economics, UC Berkeley
1972-73 IBM Laboratories, San Jose, California
1973 Lecturer, Department of Economics, Univ of California, Santa Barbara
1973-80 Professor, Department of Sociology, Bielefeld University
1974 Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, UC Berkeley
1974 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Austria
1976-79 Professor, Interfaculty of Management & Organization, Groningen University
1979-84 Group leader, National Research Center for Environment & Health (GSF), Neuherberg
1983 Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley
1983 Visiting Research Fellow, JFK School of Government, Harvard
Hypothesis 7

While an individual might be able to get away with plagiarism in a few cases over short period of time, the self-policing mechanisms of the academic community will ensure that he/she cannot continue with this over a prolonged period, let alone make a career out of it.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PRIORITY

It was noticed that the contents of a paper published in the Dutch Journal “Annals of System Research”, and also in the Romanian Journal, “Economic Computation and Economic Cybernetics Studies and Research” as well as the French Journal, “R.A.I.R.O.”, closely resembled those of a paper previously published in Automatica although the similarity was not acknowledged. Consequently the following note was submitted for publication in Automatica—Editor.


Hans W. Gottinger
University of Groningen
Netherlands
Conclusion

Does self-policing work? In this case,

• plagiarism extended over 30 years
• the plagiarist got to ‘top’ of profession
• he did not stop when detected
• detectors assumed that ‘first offence’ and gave quiet ‘slap on the wrist’, &/or too embarrassed to pursue further
• bogus Maastricht professorship not detected for 24 years

This shouldn’t have happened!

Need to revisit assumption that self-policing works

Greater vigilance and willingness to pursue well-founded suspicions required from all

• editors, referees, readers, publishers need to be alert
• universities need to investigate suspicious cases
• database to log 1st time (& repeat) offenders?
Conclusion

If have suspicions, don’t leave it to ‘someone else’ to sort out problem

A form of ‘tragedy of the commons’
  • Too much hassle for individual to pursue, but in long run makes overall situation worse for academic community

Cf. findings from game theory experiments
  • Co-operators VS defectors
  • Punishers VS ‘second-order free-riders’

Task of ‘punishing’ comes at a cost to you
Editors and universities must be prepared to incur that ‘cost’ if plagiarism and other research misconduct to be kept in check
The end of the matter?

August 2007

• Editorial in Research Policy
• Exposé in Nature & newspapers in Germany, Austria, Netherlands etc.
• HWG told Nature that now ‘semi-retired’

Stopped producing papers?
Stopped creating new affiliations and institutes?
FUBUTEC 2008, April 9-11, 2008, FEUP-University of Porto, Portugal, 2nd Call for Papers

FUBUTEC-2008
5th Annual Future Business Technology Conference 2008
2ND CALL FOR PAPERS

Limiting Risk in Business through Simulation

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Dear Colleague,

this is a reminder that the abstract submission deadline for
FUBUTEC 2008 is next January 10.
The proposals received will be reviewed by the Selection Committee to ensure a high quality and appropriate mix for the conference. The goal of the Selection Committee is to provide a diverse set of tutorials that attract a large interest among the broad segments within the diverse scientific community.

Tutorial

Industrial Economics and Management - PART I

Hans Werner Göttinger
Professor of Managerial and Industrial Economics
Institute Director
STRATEC, TU Munich, Germany

Abstract

Objectives: This part covers basic and advanced economic and managerial issues of modern industrial economics. Network effects are essential to high technology and service industries in a universal sense, and they experience managerial problems that are different from those in conventional markets. They are circumscribed by relentless, high speed dynamic competition with ever shortening product cycles. Even beh...
THE END

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Do not plagiarise!

‘The Talented Professor Gottinger’

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Starring Robin Williams
Coming to a cinema near you!